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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 940657-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Priority No. 2

KEVIN GURR,
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(f) (1994 as Amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
First, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
of illegally possessing a dangerous weapon. (Issue preserved, R.
73-83).

When examining claims of insufficiency of evidence, the

appellate court views the evidence and its reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the judge's verdict. State v.
Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Booker. 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985); State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah
App. 1992), cert denied 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
reversed

only where

reasonable doubt that

Verdicts are

reasonable minds must have entertained

a

the defendant committed the crime. Lemons,

supra, at 381; State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).
Second, the trial court committed error in determining that
the Defendant was a "restricted person" as defined in Utah Code
Annotated 76-10-503 (1989 as Amended).

The issue was preserved

at trial as demonstrated by the Defendant's post trial memorandum
(R. 73-83).
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The trial court's interpretation of a statute
question of

law. State v. Shipler, 869 P. 2d

1994); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d
The Utah

Court

correction

of

of Appeals
error

presents a

968

(Utah App.

757, 759

(Utah 1990).

"reviews questions of

law under a

standard, without

deference

to the

trial

court." State v. Baqshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. Shipler, supra.
Third, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the trial
court's

determination

possessing

marijuana

contravention

of

Utah

that

the

Defendant

was

Guilty

of

intent

distribute

in

58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)

as

with

the

Code

Annotated

to

identified in Count I of the Second Amended Information (R.31).
The issue was preserved in the lower court as evidenced by the
Defendant's post-trial memorandum (R. 74-84).
The test for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is
set out in connection with the first issue identified above.
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by a Second Amended

Information

with three Counts. The Defendant was charged with Possession of
Marijuana, a Controlled Substance, with Intent to Distribute in a
Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as Amended).
The Defendant was also charged, in Count II, with Unlawful
Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 58-37a5(1) (1953 as Amended).
2

The Defendant was charged in Count III with Possession of a
Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (1953 as Amended)
(R. 31-32).
The matter was tried to the court, without a jury, who found
the Defendant Guilty of the crimes charged but found that Counts
I and II did not occur within a drug free zone (R. 87-91).
STATUTES RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL
The
relating

Statutes

relevant

to

the

disposition

of

to possession of a dangerous weapon by

the

issues

a restricted

person are as follows:
Utah

Code

Annotated

76-10-503(1)(a)

(1989

as

Amended)

provides in relevant part as follows:
Any person who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of . . . this state. . .
may not own or have in his possession or under his
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
Utah

Code

Annotated

76-10-501(2)(c)

(1989

as

Amended)

defines "dangerous weapon" as meaning,
any

item

that

in the manner

of

its use

intended use is capable of causing death or
bodily injury.

or

serious

The following factors shall be

used in determining whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a
dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object,

or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if
any; and
(iii)

the manner in which the instrument,

object, or thing was used.
As it relates to the meaning of "custody and control" as
used in U.C.A. 76-10-503 (1989 as Amended), there is no statutory
definition.

The jury instruction that has been approved by the

Utah Supreme Court relating to those terms states:
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm
is more than the innocent handling of the weapon.
It requires a willing and knowing possession with
intent to control its use or management.
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985).
The person who is restricted by U.C.A. 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989
as Amended) is "any person who has been convicted of any crime of
violence.
Utah

. . . "
Code

Annotated

76-10-501(2)(a)

defines

"crime

of

violence" as:
. . . aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter,
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary,
housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied
by

threats

of

violence,

assault

with

a

dangerous

weapon, assault. . . arson. . . or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses. (Emphasis added.)
There are no determinative statutes relating to the issue
relating to possession "with intent to distribute."
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE
4

1.

The Defendant was bound-over to the District Court on

three counts, as delineated

in the Second Amended

Information

(30-31):
Count I:

Possession of Marijuana, a Controlled

Substance, with Intent to Distribute in a Drug Free
Zone, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as Amended),
in that the Defendant, on or about October 20, 1993,
in Utah County, Utah, did knowingly and intentionally
possess (sic) marijuana, a controlled substance with
intent to distribute in a drug free zone.
Count II:

Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug

Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a Class A
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated
58-37a-5(l) (1953 as Amended), in that the Defendant,
on or about October 20, 1993, in Utah County, Utah did
knowingly and intentionally use or possess with intent
to use, drug paraphernalia. . . .
Count III:

Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a

Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (1953 as Amended), in
that the Defendant, on or about October 20, 1993, in
Utah County, Utah, a person convicted

of a crime of

violence had in his possession or under his custody or
control a dangerous weapon, namely, a firearm.
R.30-31.
2.

After a trial to the court, sitting without a jury,

5

which was held on the 26th of April, 1994, the Honorable Ray M.
Harding

authorized

parties

(R.

Defendant

the

62-64).

submitted

filing of post-trial
Attorneys

memoranda

for

both

regarding

memoranda

the

State

their

by

the

and

the

respective

positions (R. 65-83).
3.

On June 28, 1994, Judge Harding

signed

a Memorandum

Decision finding that Count I and II, relating to the possession
of marijuana

with

intent to distribute

and the possession

of

paraphernalia did not occur within "drug free zones" as defined
by Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8(5) (a)

(1953 as Amended) (R. 84-

85).
4.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law signed by Judge

Harding provided in relevant part as follows:
1. The Defendant . . . was convicted of burglary,
CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on May 2,
1986.
2. On October 20, 1993, the Defendant was present in
a house/camp trailer occupies by him when officers of
the Narcotics Task Force executed a warrant authorizing
a search of the trailer. . .
4. No one else resided in the trailer at the time of
the execution of the search warrant.
5.
Personal property including possessions and
clothing of the defendant were located in the trailer.
6. The trailer was quite small, approximately 10 feet
wide by 12 or 14 feet long.
7. Officers located 8 separate baggies containing 1/8
ounce and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the
trailer in the general vicinity of the built-in table
on one end of the trailer.
8. Officers also located a set of "finger scales",
capable of measuring small amounts or quantities.
6

9. Near the table officers located a number of larger
sized bags containing marijuana residue.
Officers
testified that the bags were of the type typically used
to package larger amounts of marijuana which would then
be broken for sale into smaller quantities such as
baggies of marijuana recovered.
10. A Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22
caliber rifle were located in a closet inside the
trailer.
11. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the
Defendant, while he did not own the firearms, knowingly
had possession of the weapons.
12.
A Motorola
trailer.

mobile phone was

found

within

the

13. In response to questions from the officers, the
Defendant stated that the marijuana had been "fronted"
or provided on credit and that people called on the
phone to inquire about marijuana.
14. Officers located several pipes used for the
ingestion of marijuana.
R. 87-89.
5.
the

From the Findings of Fact, Judge Harding concluded that

Defendant

knowingly

paraphernalia.

and

intentionally

The court concluded

possessed

drug

that the Defendant was a

restricted person and knowingly and intentionally had firearms in
his custody or control. Finally, the court concluded that the
Defendant

possessed

marijuana

with

the

intent

to

distribute

(Addendum No. 1, R, 87).
6.

Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Judge Harding signed an Order on August 10, 1994, finding the
Defendant

Guilty

on

all

three

Counts

but

concluded

that the

crimes did not occur within a "drug free zone" (R. 90-91).
7. On October 3, 1994, Judge Harding pronounced sentence and
7

the Judgment and Order of Probation was signed and entered.

The

trial court sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years on Counts 1 and
III.

The court sentenced the Defendant to the Utah County Jail

on Count II for an indeterminate term not to exceed six months.
The sentences were to run concurrently.
sentence

and placed

The court suspended the

the Defendant on probation

for

thirty-six

months and ordered as a term thereof, that the Defendant serve
thirty

days

in

the

Utah

County

Jail

and

pay

fines

and

assessments (R. 93-94).
8.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 19, 1994 (R.

97).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Deputy Shaun Adamson of the Utah County Sheriff's Office

testified that he executed a search warrant during the night on a
small camp trailer measuring 10f wide by 12 f to 14 ! in length,
located at 935 South State in Provo, Utah County (T. 124-5, 137).
The officer was greeted by the Defendant.
cellular

phone on a counter

The officer observed a

and the Defendant's

clothing

and

personal items throughout the small trailer (T. 127-8).
2.

In

response

to

questions

by

Officer

Adamson,

the

Defendant testified that the cellular phone had been a work phone
but that he had received phone calls from persons interested in
purchasing drugs and that the cellular phone was used because it
was

easier

to get

in touch with the Defendant. However, the

Defendant did not testify to making any drug deals over the phone
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or otherwise (T. 129-30, 133). Officer Blackhurst was the only
Officer who testified that the Defendant admitted to making sales
and

having

the marijuana

fronted

to him

(T. 164, 216). The

Defendant testifies that he told the officers that he had not
used the cellular phone to arrange to purchase or sell marijuana
and

that he did not

tell

the officers that he had

sold

any

marijuana (T. 199).
3.

Officer Adamson found several baggies of marijuana in a

shoe box that were in eighth of an ounce packages (T. 130, 134).
The Officer also located finger scales, used to measure envelopes
for postage (T. 132, 134) that are sold in office supply stores
and not capable of weighing anything like a quarter of a pound
(T. 135). No larger scales were found (T. 170-71).

The Officer

also found firearms (T. 132).
4.

Officer

Mike

Blackhurst

testified

that

he

observed

leaves of marijuana on a table by small plastic bags that the
officer testified were the same as the zip-lock bags he had seen
in transactions where marijuana had been sold (T.144-45) and that
he recovered marijuana residue and cups (T. 157-58).
5.

Officer Blackhurst testified he recovered two firearms

consisting of a rifle and shotgun in a "built-in kind of closet"
(T. 145-46).
6.
marijuana

The

results

taken

from

from

the

crime

the trailer

lab

consisted

revealed
of

that

the

16.4 grams of

marijuana in four plastic bags; 5.1 grams in two plastic bags of
crushed marijuana; and, 6.3 grams of crushed marijuana in

9

two

plastic

bags.

The

total

was

eight

bags

and

27.5

grams

of

marijuana (T. 147-48).
7.

Officer

Blackhurst

testified

that

in his

experience

marijuana is packaged in eighth ounce or quarter ounce bags when
sold.

The Officer testified that he had seen marijuana packaged

in half pound and pound bags (T. 149-50).

The officer testified

that an ounce bag of marijuana would typically cost $180.00 and
broken down into eighth ounces and sold for $30 to $40 (T. 15051).

The Officer

testified

that

it would be uncommon

for a

person to buy four to six eighth ounce baggies for personal use
(T.

152).

gallon

The Officer

bags

that

had

also testified

marijuana

to

residue

finding
in

them

five

empty

that

would

represent how marijuana is bought in larger half pound quantities
(T. 153-55).
8.

The Defendant testified that as of October 1, 1993, he

was living with his girl friend, Joan Pew, in Springville at a
residence

other

than

the

trailer

(T. 176-77).

Joan Pew Also

testified

that the Defendant had been living with her

for at

least a week prior to the Defendant's arrest (T. 211-212).
Defendant

testified

that he had

lived

in the trailer

The

for two

years prior to moving in with his girlfriend at the request of
Mr. Tom King, the owner of T & T Mechanical, the business located
next to the trailer, to thwart theft and vandalism (T. 177-78).
9.

The Defendant testified that the small camp trailer was

used by Steven Page, Mr. King's foster son, who was living in the
larger mobile home

located closely to the camp trailer.
10

The

Defendant testified that since the mobile home did not have water
or power hooked up, Steven Page had a key
trailer

to

shower

and use the telephone

and used the camp

(T. 178-79).

Myron

Johnson was another individual that was using the trailer and had
a key to it (T. 179).

Other keys to the camp trailer were held

by Tom King and Stan (T. 179). Tom King verified the Defendant's
testimony with regard to the trailers and testified that Steve
Page did use the camp trailer for watching TV, making phone calls
and showering (T. 202-03).

Additionally, the coffee pot in the

trailer was used by shop workers and several persons had keys to
the trailer (T 204).

Mr. King also verified that the Defendant

had vacated the trailer a week prior to his arrest (T. 204).
10. After vacating the trailer the first of October, 1993,
the Defendant testified that the trailer

was used by individuals

to make coffee, use the phone and to stay at night on occasion
(T.

179-80).

The Defendant had just quit his employment

October 15, 1993 and started with another company.

on

The Defendant

produced his income records showing that he had been gainfully
employed during the year (T. 181-82).
11.

The Defendant testified that on the night of the search

he had arrived at the trailer at 10:30 to 10:40 p.m. and that he
had not been at the trailer earlier that day.

The Defendant was

in the process of checking messages when the officers knocked
(T. 180-81).

Mr. King verified that the Defendant had not been

at the trailer earlier in the day (T. 205).
12.

The Defendant acknowledged that he had a half of an
11

ounce of marijuana
purchased

a half

at the trailer.

an ounce

He testified that he had

in four eighths

(T. 183-84).

The

Defendant testified that it is unusual to buy in eights but he
purchased

the

last

his

supplier

had

and

it was

packaged

in

eighths (T. 184).
13.

The Defendant denied selling any of the marijuana and

denied breaking the marijuana down into smaller quantities.

The

Defendant explained that the residue was on the table because he
had just gotten some out to smoke (T. 184-85).

The Defendant

also acknowledged that the two items of paraphernalia were his
(T. 185). The Defendant testified that the larger bags were used
to collect top soil and had never had marijuana in them to his
knowledge (190-91).

The smaller bags, the Defendant testified,

were used to store sandwiches
the

Defendant's

wallet

was

(T. 192).

from

his

The $360.00 found in

last paycheck,

received

several days before his arrest (T. 199-200).
14.

As

it relates

to the

finger

scales, the

Defendant

testified that it came with a mail chart and was last used by
him to weigh a package he intended to mail to obtain a flashlight
(T.

186).

He

testified

that

the

scales would

only

measure

approximately two or three ounces (T. 186).
15.

The Defendant testified that in purchasing marijuana

for personal use, he had seen his supplier use heavier scales,
called triple beams (T. 187).
16. The Defendant testified the mobile phone was his, but
the company owned the air time.

The phone was needed
12

because his girl friend was pregnant.

The phone was never used

to purchase or sell marijuana (T. 188).
17.

The

Defendant

previously with burglary

acknowledged

that

he

was

charged

for going to his ex-wifefs house and

getting in a fight with her boyfriend

(T. 189).

However, the

crime was reduced to a Class A Misdemeanor (T. 189).
18. The Defendant did not know that he could not own or
possess a firearm after his probation was terminated (T. 189).
The two firearms in the closet were a 12 gauge Mossberg and a
Springfield .22 rifle (T. 190).

The 12 gauge Mossberg belonged

to Tom King and had never been used by the Defendant (T. 190).
Mr. King verified that
trailer (T. 206-07).

the shotgun was his and was kept in the

The other rifle belonged to the Defendant's

father and had never been used by the Defendant (T. 190).

The

Defendant neither testified that he knew the guns were in the
trailer nor that he had ever used or controlled them (T. 194).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant does not appeal or dispute the finding of the
trial

court

as

it

relates

to

the

possession

of

drug

paraphernalia.
As it relates to possession of a firearm by a restricted
person,
simply

the judgment
insufficient

is clearly

deficient.

The evidence

is

to establish that the Defendant knew the

firearms were in the camp trailer and there

is absolutely no

evidence that the Defendant exercised control over the guns at
any time.

The evidence is clear that he did not own the guns and

13

the State failed to prove their connection to the Defendant other
than being in a camp trailer that the Defendant had abandoned as
his residence.
Additionally, the Defendant was not a restricted person as
defined by the statute.

The Defendant's plea to the Burglary

charge was amended by the trial court's granting of a 402 motion
reducing both the category of ten crime and the sentence to a
misdemeanor trespassing charge.

Inasmuch as the Defendant is not

a restricted person, he cannot be guilty of the crime.
Finally,
conviction

the

of

evidence

"intent

to

was

insufficient

distribute."

The

to

support

evidence

a

simply

supports possession and the finding of the trial court in that
regard should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON.
A.

The Definition of the Crime.

The Defendant was charged in Count III with possessing a
dangerous weapon while he was

a restricted

person. Utah

Code

Annotated 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) provides in relevant
part as follows:
Any person who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of . . . this state. . .
may not own or have in his possession or under his
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
Utah

Code

Annotated

76-10-501(2)(c)

defines "dangerous weapon" as meaning,
14

(1989

as

Amended)

.

any

item

that

in the manner

intended use is capable of causing
bodily injury.

of

its use

death or

or

serious

The following factors shall be

used in determining whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a
dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object,
or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if
any; and
(iii)

the manner in which the instrument,

object, or thing was used.
As it relates to the meaning of "custody and control" as
used in U.C.A. 76-10-503 (1989 as Amended), there is no statutory
definition.

The jury instruction that has been approved by the

Utah Supreme Court relating to those terms states:
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm
is more than the innocent handling of the weapon.
It requires a willing and knowing possession with
intent to control its use or management.
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985).
B.

Test on Appeal.

This Court in evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the trial court!s verdict. State v. Vigh,
supra; State v. Booker, supra; State v. Lemons, supra.
Verdicts are reversed only where reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
15

crime of which he was convicted. State v. Vigh, supra; State v.
Lemon, supra; State v. Johnson, supra.
C.

Summary of the Evidence in This Case.

The evidence relating to the firearms is not complicated or
really controverted.

When the officers searched the small camp

trailer,
A Mossburg 12 Gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22
caliber

rifle

were

located

in

a closet

inside

the

trailer.
Finding No. 10, R. 88.
The evidence is uncontroverted that the Defendant did not
own the firearms.

In fact, Mr. Tom King testified that he owned

the shotgun that was stored in the camp trailer as well as other
items of personal property located therein (T. 206-207).

It was

T & T Mechanical, of which Mr. King was a partial owner, that
owned the camp trailer where the search warrant was executed (T.
201-03).
The only testimony regarding the other firearm was from the
Defendant who testified that the gun was his father's gun (T.
189-90).
The Defendant testified that he did not use either gun on
any

occasion

(T. 189-90).

There was no

testimony

that

the

Defendant even knew the guns were in the trailer.
The testimony is uncontroverted that the camp trailer, where
the Defendant was arrested was owned by T & T Mechanical, was
occupied by at least four different individuals plus the shop
16

personnel

who

went

in

the

trailer

for

coffee.

Two

of

the

individuals went to the camp trailer to shower, watch TV and
make telephone calls.

Additionally, the Defendant had moved out

of the trailer at least a week before the search and obviously
had not taken the guns with him.

No one testified that they saw

the guns in the Defendant's possession or under his control.
A case very similar to the case at bar is that of State v.
Banks, 720 P. 2d 1380

(Utah 1986).

In that case the evidence

relating to the alleged possession of a dangerous weapon is as
follows.

The execution of a no-knock warrant revealed Banks (an

admittedly "restricted person" as defined by statute), his wife
and

a third

party

as

residents

of

the

house.

During

the

subsequent search, the officers saw a shotgun leaning against a
dresser

in

a bedroom.

A

further

search

of

the

residence

revealed three other guns: two were found under the pillow on a
bed and a third was in a bedroom dresser drawer. Id.
In reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that
the

evidence

was

insufficient

to

support

a

conviction

for

possessing a firearm:
Section 76-10-503(1) of the Code prohibits any
person who has been convicted of a crime of violence
from owning or having a dangerous weapon "in his
possession or under his control."
was

a

restricted

prohibitions applied.

person

to

Banks unquestionably
whom

the

Statute's

The only question, then, is

whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that
17

Banks possessed or controlled the .22 caliber Ruger
found in

bedroom at his residence.

Id.
Banks contended that although the weapon was found under a
pillow in a bedroom, there was no evidence to indicate that the
bedroom was occupied by Banks rather than his wife or the third
party who also resided in the apartment.
evidence

that Banks owned

presence

of

the gun

a gun.

Further, there was no

The State

in Bank's residence

argued

should

that

the

be enough to

impute its possession and control to him, even if he shared the
residence and therefore the possession of the gun with his wife
and third party.

In response, the Court stated:

If the evidence showed that Banks "exercised dominion
and control" over the weapon, "with knowledge of its
presence," we would
Banks
shared

could

be

control

have no difficulty

convicted,

even

though

holding

that

he may

have

of the weapon with his wife

and

the

third party. See State v. Bankhead, 514 P. 2d 800, 803
(Utah 1973); State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872, 874 (Utah
1964). However, there is absolutely no evidence that
Banks knew the weapon was in the apartment or that
he exercised any control over it.

There is no logic to

the State's suggestion that the mere presence of a gun
in banks' house supports an inference that Banks knew
the gun was present or that he had some control over
it.

Nor does the record suggest that either the third
18

party or Banks1 wife was a restricted person who could
not

lawfully

evidence,

own

or possess

for example,

that

a gun.

There

Banks, rather

is no

than

the

third party who admittedly lived in the house, slept in
or otherwise used the bedroom or bed in which the gun
was found.

It would be wholly arbitrary to conclude

that the mere presence of the gun in the
apartment
other

two

meant

that

people

controlled it.

Banks, rather

residing

than one of the

there,

possessed

or

The record here shows a simple failure

to prove a critical element of the offense; we must
therefore find that there was insufficient evidence to
support the conviction and reverse. (Emphasis added.)
Id.
As with the Banks case, there is absolutely no testimony
that Mr. Gurr "exercised dominion and control" over the weapons
"with knowledge of their presence."

No officer or other person

testified that the Defendant had ever been in physical control of
the guns or ever taken them out of the closet where they were
stored.
The fact that the Defendant had moved into the residence of
his girl friend in Springville and not taken the guns is evidence
of

his

lack

conversation

of

control

with

an

over

them.

informant

or

There
officer

is
in

not

even

which

a

the

Defendant's knowledge of the guns in the trailer is established.
The officers did not interrogate any of the other persons who had
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access to the trailer with regard to ownership and control and in
fact, the State did not present

any evidence of ownership

or

control.
The

trial

court

concluded

in

Finding

No.

11

that

"the

evidence adduced at trial indicated that the Defendant, while he
did

not

own

the

firearms,

knowingly

had

possession

of

the

weapons." (Emphasis added.) (R. 88).
The trial court's finding in this case is clearly against
the weight of the evidence. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah
App. 1990).

Additionally, deference can only be given to the

trial court when the findings disclose "the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id.

There

is simply no evidence in the record that would support the trial
court's
weapons.

conclusion

that

he

knowingly

had

possession

of

the

As mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in State v.

Davis, supra, there must be evidence to support the conclusion
that the firearm was more than innocently handled.

There must be

a showing that there was a willing and knowing possession with
intent to control its use or management.
The

evidence

is

clearly

inadequate

to

support

the

determination by the trial court and the judgment and verdict on
Count III must be reversed.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DETERMINING
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS A "RESTRICTED PERSON."
A.
The

Definition of the Crime.
elements

of

a violation

of

the

law

prohibiting

a

restricted person from possessing a dangerous weapon are set out
20

in Point

I above.

However, the person who

is restricted

by

U.C.A. 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) is "any person who has
been convicted of any crime of violence.
Utah

Code

Annotated

..."

76-10-501(2)(a)

defines

"crime

of

violence" as:
. . . aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter,
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary,
housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied
by

threats

of

violence,

assault

with

a

dangerous

weapon, assault. . . arson. . . or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses. (Emphasis added.)
B.

Test on Appeal.

The trial court? s interpretation of a statute
question of

law. State v.

Shipler, 869 P.2d

1994); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d
The Utah

Court

correction

of Appeals

of error

presents a

968

(Utah App.

757, 759

(Utah 1990).

"reviews questions of

law under a

standard, without

deference

to the trial

court." State v. Bagshaw, 836 P. 2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. Shipler, supra.
C.

Evidence in This Case.

The evidence relating

to the Defendant's conviction of a

prior criminal act encompassed the offering of State's Exhibit
No.

1, a Minute Entry

from Case No. CR-86-144, filed

in the

Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah,
dated May 2, 1986.

The Minute Entry is entitled "Judgment" and

states in pertinent part as follows:
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The defendant [Kevin Gurr] previously entered a
plea of Guilty to a charge of Burglary, a Third
Degree Felony, at which time the matter was referred
to Adult Probation and Parole. . . Mr. Petro,
[Defendant's attorney] had a motion to sentence
defendant under the next lower offense. . . The
Court granted the defense motion and defendant to
be sentenced under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the
circumstances surrounding the charge. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
State's Exhibit No 1, Addendum No. 2.
The

next

lower

Trespass

(U.C.A.

question

that when

category

76-6-206

from

(1953

a Burglary

as Amended)).

a motion made, pursuant

to

is

Criminal

There

is no

U.C.A.76-3-402

(1953 as Amended), is granted to sentence under the next lower
category, the conviction and sentence are deemed to be for the
lesser charge.
(1)

The statute states as follows:
If the court, having regard to the nature and

circumstances of the offense of which the defendant
was found guilty and to the history and character
of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly
harsh to record the conviction as being for that
category of offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally
applicable to that offense, the court may, unless
specifically provided by law, enter a judgment of
22

conviction for the next lower category of offense
and impose sentence accordingly, . . . (Emphasis
added.)
The judgment
criminal

of

conviction

trespass

and

in this case was

accordingly,

the

for misdemeanor

Defendant

was

not

convicted of Burglary and thereby a restricted person as defined
by U.C.A. 76-10-501 (1989 as Amended).
Although the Defendant went to great lengths to make this
argument to the trial court (R. 74-76), the Findings of the Court
are essentially silent with regard to the issue:
1.

The Defendant, Kevin W. Gurr, was convicted of

burglary, CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on
May 2, 1986. . . .
2.

the Defendant, a restricted person under U.C.A.

Section 76-10-503, 1953 as amended, knowingly and
intentionally had firearms in his custody and
control.
R. 87-89, Addendum No 1.
In reviewing a statute, it is the duty of this Court assume
that each term of a statute was used advisedly and that each
should be given interpretation

and application

in accord with

their usually accepted meaning. Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971); Board of Education of Granite School Dist.
v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983).

A statute should

not be applied other than in accordance with its literal wording
unless it is so unclear or inoperable. Gord v. Salt Lake City,
23

434 P. 2d 449 (Utah 1967); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline
Const, , 754 P.2d

672 (Utah App. 1988); Gleave v. Denver & Rio

Grande Western R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988).
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-402 (1989 as Amended) provides that
if the trial courts grants a 402 motion, the court will "enter a
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense
and

impose

sentence accordingly.

statute

does

not

lowered

and

does

limit
not

reduction can be put.

. . ." (Emphasis added.) The

the purpose
distinguish

for which
the

uses

the

to

charge

which

a

is
402

The statute is clear that it is not only

the sentence that will be influenced but that the actual judgment
of conviction is lowered to the "next category" of offense.
It is only logical that if that reduction affords a person
any benefit

as it relates to rights and privileges, there is

nothing in the statute that restricts it f s use.

In other words,

if a Third Degree Felony is reduced to a Class A Misdemeanor by
means

of

a 402 motion, the person would

limitations of a felony
like.

no

longer have

as it affects voting, bonding

the

or the

Similarly, if a 402 motion eliminates a person from a

category of restricted

persons, the defendant

should have the

benefit of the reduction.
In accordance with the clear meaning of the statute, the
conviction of the Defendant was reduced from Burglary to the next
lower category, trespass, which is not a crime of violence that
would restrict a person's ability to own and possess a firearm.
The

judgment

of

conviction

in this
24

case was

for

misdemeanor

criminal

trespass

and

accordingly,

the

Defendant

was

not

convicted of Burglary and thereby a r e s t r i c t e d person as defined
by U.C.A. 76-10-501 (1989 as Amended).
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING MARIJUANA WITH THE INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE.
A.

The Definition of the Crime.

The Defendant was charged in Count I of the Second Amended
Information

with

possession

of Marijuana

With

the

Intent

to

Distribute (R. 31).
B.

Test on Appeal.

This Court in evaluating a claim of insufficiency of the
evidence, views the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the trial court's verdict. State v. Vigh,
supra; State v. Booker, supra; State v. Lemons, supra.
Verdicts are reversed only where reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted. State v. Vigh, supra; State v.
Lemon, supra; State v. Johnson, supra.
C.

Summary of the Evidence in This Case.

The evidence in the case establishes that the Defendant had
moved from the trailer, as his residence, at least a week before
the execution of the search warrant and his arrest.
camp trailer was occupied by another individual.

The small

In addition,

two other individuals who had been staying at the mobile home
(that did not have any utilities) used the small camp trailer to
watch TV, make telephone calls and take showers.
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there were also

employees of the company, including the owner that used the camp
trailer to do books or to have a cup of coffee.

The Defendant

was simply not in exclusive possession of the camp trailer.
As it relates to the mobile phone, the cellular phone was
his but the air time was that of his employer.

He kept the phone

with him because his girl friend was pregnant.

There was no

evidence that the Defendant used the phone to buy drugs or to
sell them.
The money in the Defendant's wallet was explained by his
cashing of his check from his job.

The Defendant demonstrated

that he had been gainfully employed during the entire year and
had only quit his job shortly before his arrest and had already
been hired by another company.
Although

the

Defendant

acknowledged

that

he

purchased

approximately one-half ounce of marijuana for personal use, there
was simply no evidence of intent to distribute.

The Defendant

testified that the marijuana was packaged as it was because it
was the last that his supplier had and it was packaged in eighth
ounces.
There was no evidence that the Defendant had been at the
trailer

earlier

in the

day of his

arrest.

The presence

of

sandwich bags was explained by the number of bachelor men making
lunches and eating them in the trailer.

Although the officers

testified to larger bags, there was no evidence that the bags
were tested for drugs and resulted in any detection of marijuana.
The Defendant explained the presence of the finger scales.
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He indicated that he purchased them with a mail rate guide and
last used them to mail a package.

The scales would weigh only

two or three ounces and were incapable of weighing larger amounts
again

suggesting

that

the Defendant

was not

set up to

sell

marijuana.
There was no testimony in this case of any informant buys
from

the

defendant

or

an observations

of buys made

from the

Defendant.
In sum, all the State produced was the packaged marijuana,
finger

scales

evidence

of

and

plastic

bags.

a buy, recorded

The

State

conversations,

did
large

not

produce

amounts

of

marijuana, scales that could weigh large amounts or any other
indicia of a drug dealer.

Even the trial court's findings limit

themselves to the 8 separate baggies, the finger scales and the
presence

of

the

larger

bags

as

supporting

the

"intent

to

distribute" (R. 87-89, Addendum No. 1 ) .
The

amount

of

marijuana

found

and

the

circumstances

surrounding the arrest warrant a finding that the Defendant did
not possess marijuana with the intent to distribute the same.
One appropriate standard to consider in determining the severity
of

the

amount.

crime

of possession

Pursuant

to

of marijuana

U.C.A.

is to consider

58-37-8(2)(b)(i-iii)

(1953

the
as

Amended), possession of 100 pounds of marijuana or more is a
second degree felony; possession of 16 ounces to 100 pounds is a
third degree felony; and, possession of less that 16 ounces is a
class A misdemeanor.

In this case, the Defendant had less than
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28 grams which is consistent with a misdemeanor.
In determining whether the Defendant should be charged with
"intent to distribute," reference should be made to the relevant
case law.

The overwhelming majority of cases which dealt with

defendants

charged with possession with intent

included

additional

extrinsic

evidence

to distribute,

in addition to a small

quantity of drugs or, an extremely large cache od drugs.

State

v. Brooks, 849 P. 2d 640 (Utah App. 1993) (officers found drugs,
contraband,

and

violations);
(officers

other

State v.

seized

ammunition,

evidence

Purser,

controlled

828 P. 2d

3,000 amphetamine

packaging

of

515

substance

(Utah App.

tablets, several

materials,

large

1992)

firearms,

scales,

drug

paraphernalia, cash, marijuana seeds, etc.); State v. Park, 810
P. 2d 456 (Utah App. 1991) (officers found marijuana, cash and a
methamphetamine kit); State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 213 (Utah App.
1991) (search revealed one pound of cocaine and twenty pounds of
marijuana);

State

v.

Bobo,

803

P.2d

1268

(Utah

App.

1990)

(officers found two boxes of marijuana in fridge, cocaine and
psilocybin mushrooms in a safe); State v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431
(Utah

App.

1990)

marijuana);
(officers

(officers

State

found

v.

two

Smith,
baggies

found
781
of

eight
P.2d

duffel
879

cocaine,

bags

(Utah

several

full

App.

of

1989)

bundles

of

cocaine, and defendant was charged with one count of possession
and one count of intent to distribute).

The Court in State v.

Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), held that in addition to the fact
that the Defendant was growing marijuana in his residence, that
28

the key element is a Defendant's possession of an amount too
large for personal consumption.
with the amount purchased

There was nothing inconsistent

by the Defendant

and the

"personal

use"
It is respectfully

submitted

that the

facts viewed

most

favorably from the judgment of the trial court simply does not
support

the conclusion that the Defendant possessed

marijuana

with the intent to distribute. All of the evidence is consistent
with personal use.
found

the

Accordingly, the portion of the judgment that

Defendant

guilty

intent

to

distribute

should

be

reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant does not appeal or dispute the finding of the
trial

court

as

it

relates

to

the

possession

of

drug

paraphernalia.
As it relates to possession of a firearm by a restricted
person,
simply

the judgment
insufficient

is clearly
to establish

deficient.

The evidence

is

that the Defendant knew the

firearms were in the camp trailer and there is absolutely

no

evidence that the Defendant exercised control over the guns at
any time.

The evidence is clear that he did not own the guns and

the State failed to prove their connection to the Defendant other
than being in a camp trailer that the Defendant had abandoned as
his residence.
Additionally, the Defendant was not a restricted person as
defined by the statute.

The Defendant's plea to the Burglary
29

charge was amended by the trial court's granting of a 402 motion
reducing both the category of ten crime and the sentence to a
misdemeanor trespassing charge.

Inasmuch as the Defendant is not

a restricted person, he cannot be guilty of the crime.
Finally,
conviction

of

the

evidence

"intent

to

was

insufficient

distribute."

The

to

support

evidence

a

simply

supports possession and the finding of the trial court in that
regard should be reversed.
Dated this

day of February, 1995.

Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
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Exhibit 1

Utah County, Statt
* of Utth
Uti

ifflf
" . >or

CAi

SMITH, CJ«rk
— Deputy

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
KEVIN W. GURR,

Case No. 941400013 FS
Defendant(s).

Judge Ray M. Harding

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Ray M.
Harding presiding, on the 26th day of April, 1994. The Court has
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The
Court has determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant
committed the crimes of: Count I, Possession of Marijuana with

6

Intent to Distribute,-MCount II, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia;

0

5

and Count III, Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person.
Accordingly, a verdict of guilt to those three counts is entered.

91

The matter will be set for sentencing on the next available date on
the Court's regular calendar.
DATED this /O

day of fe^-T-994.
BY THE COURT:

6£~^-cCu^tsi

HARDING
JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MICHAEL J. PETRO
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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•" u ' 1 " ^uuiuidi uisinci uourt ot
Utah County, state of Utah

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026

—.

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VS.

KEVIN W. GURRf

Case No. 941400013 FS
Defendant(s).

Judge Ray M. Harding

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Ray M.
Harding presiding on the 26th day of April, 1994.

The Plaintiff

was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor.
The Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney
Michael Petro. The court heard the evidence of the parties and has
issued a written ruling. Being fully advised in the premises, the
Court determines that the following have been established beyond a
reasonable doubt:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Defendant, Kevin W. Gurr, was convicted of burglary,

CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on May 2, 1986.
2.

On October 20, 1993, the Defendant was present in a

house/camp trailer occupied by him when officers of the Narcotics
Task Force executed a warrant authorizing a search of the trailer.
3.

The trailer was within 1,000 feet of the grounds of a
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church but not within 1,000 feet of the church itself.
4.

No one else resided in the trailer at the time of the

execution of the search warrant,
5.

Personal property including possessions and clothing of

the defendant were located in the trailer.
6. The trailer was quite small, approximately 10 feet wide by
12 or 14 feet long.
7.

Officers located 8 separate baggies containing 1/8 ounce

and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the trailer in the general
vicinity of the built-in table on one end of the trailer.
8. Officers also located a set of "finger scales", capable of
measuring small amounts or quantities.
9.

Near the table officers located a number of larger sized

bags containing marijuana residue.

Officers testified that the

bags were of the type typically used to package larger amounts of
marijuana which would

then be broken

for sale

into

smaller

quantities such as the baggies of marijuana recovered.
10. A Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22 caliber
rifle were located in a closet inside the trailer.
11.

The evidence

adduced

at

trial

indicated

that the

Defendant, while* he did not own the firearms, knowingly had
possession of the weapons.
12.

A motorola mobile phone was found within the trailer.

13. In response to questions from the officers, the Defendant
stated that the marijuana had been "fronted" or provided on credit

2

and that people had called on the phone to inquire about marijuana.
14. Officers located several pipes used for the ingestion of
marijuana.
From the forgoing findings of fact the Court makes and enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

Defendant

was

knowingly

and

intentionally

in

possession of drug paraphernalia including items used or intended
for use in the storage or consumption of marijuana.
2.

The Defendant, a restricted person under U.C.A. Section

76-10-503,

1953

as

amended,

knowingly

and

intentionally

had

firearms in his custody or control.
3.

The Defendant had possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute the marijuana.
4. None of the activities described took place within a drug
free zone.
DATED this / Q

day of 5s3L-1994.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

MICHAEL J. PETRO
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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'

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTw
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NUMBER:

CR-86-144

vs.

DATE:

KEVIN GURR,

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

Defendant.

Rept.:

May 2, 1986

E.V. Quist, CSR

JUDGMENT
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of
Judgment with Kent Barry, Deputy County Attorney, appearing in
and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present in
Court and was represented by Attorney Michael Petro.
The defendant previously entered a plea of Guilty to a
charge of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, at which time the
matter was referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department
for a presentence investigation and report. The report has now
been completed and submitted to the Court along with the recommendations.
Mr. Petro addressed the Court in defendant's behalf and
stated the defendant concurs with the recommendation with the
exception of the 30 day jail time. Mr. Petro made a Motion to
sentence defendant under the next lower offense.
The State objected to defense motion and argued same.
The defendant addressed the Court in his own behalf.
The Court granted the defense motion and defendant to
be sentence under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the circumstances
surrounding the charge.
There being no legal reason why Judgment should not be
pronounced at this time, it is now the Judgment of the Court that

the defendant be confined in the Utah County Jail for a period of
one (1) year, pay a fine of $500.00 and restitution as is
appropriate under direction of the Probation Department.
Execution on the jail sentence is suspended and defendant placed
on probation under the following conditions:
1. Defendant to enter agreement with Adult Probation
and Parole Department and comply with terms of
probation.
2.

That he make himself available to the Department
and the Court when requested to do so.

3.

That he violate no laws of the United States, Utah
or any municipality wherein he may reside.

4.

Defendant to pay a fine of $500.00 or perform 100
hours Community Services in lieu of that fine.

5.

That he pay restitution as directed by the Probation Department.

6.

That he have no contact with the victims during his
probation period.

7.

Defendant to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail
with work release as arranged with the Department.

The defendant to report to the Utah County Jail no
latter than 7:00 p.m. Monday, May 5th, 1986.
The Court to retain jurisdiction in this matter as to
change this order from time to time when so warranted.
Dated this J/
dav of May, 1986.
BY THE COURT:

STATE OF UTAH )
)SS
COUNTY OF UTAH )
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Fourfi Dwtrtct Court
erf Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that the
annexed and foregoing is a true and full copy of an
original document on file in my office as such Clerk.
Witness my hang^and s.eal of said Court
tyi/F^*'

C2C6&L <f

y^

CULLEN Y

(%^/^y^L^
TENSEN, JUDGE

